

'Old wine in new bottles?' Extension and service delivery organisations for small farmers in rural mountain regions of north Vietnam

Adam Fforde, Principal Fellow, Melbourne Institute of Asian Languages and Societies, University of Melbourne, Australia¹

5,105 words including abstract, references and Bib.

fforde@unimelb.edu.au

Abstract

The paper discusses the overall context of institutional change in the uplands of northern Vietnam. This is then linked to the public:private mix in service delivery, and the opportunities and constraints that come from the gradualist Vietnamese approach. Since the shift away from cooperative-organised farming did not accompany a major shift in overall development policy away from the state sector in processing and marketing, it is only now as the private sector emerges that fundamental choices for policy-makers are coming to the fore.

Key words: Vietnam, transition, rural development, extension, organisational change.

'Old wine in new bottles?' Extension and service delivery organisations for small farmers in rural mountain regions of north Vietnam

Introduction

The history of extension and rural services delivery in the upland areas of north Vietnam shows a process of adaptation rather than root-and-branch reform; this contrasts with the fundamental change 'from plan to market' that has taken place since national reunification in 1975. By comparison with China, however, this had led to better results since in Vietnam state-sponsored rural service delivery organisations were not largely removed with the pro-market reforms [Deng 1995; Zhang and Sjoberg 1995; Fforde 1999]. The risks associated with failing to attain a balance between public and private goods aspects of extension as for other rural service delivery systems are well known [Haug 1999].

Excesses associated with 'Big Bang' approaches risk creating situations where public goods production is sub-optimal, leading to efficiency and welfare losses. The gradualist approach to change in Vietnam therefore offers an example of the survival of public service delivery organisations in a country where development policy now supports aggressive globalisation [de Vylder and Fforde 1996; World Bank 2003]. Whilst a formal extension service system was set up in 1993 [Poussard 1999], its operation, however, needs to be seen in the wider context of institutional change. This paper discusses the practical problems facing rural service delivery in the Uplands of northern Vietnam within a medium term time horizon.

Vietnam has a peculiar history of rural institutions (both traditional and modern), providing services to peasants. In my book "Agrarian Question" [Fforde

1989], I provided an insight into the institutional quality and the economic and political context of the cooperatives supported by the regime. Today, the echo of this collectivisation period is still vivid in the minds of many grey-haired small farmers, as well as in the ways in which state development is thought and organised, such as in extension and other service deliveries.

There are various particular historical aspects to the current situation, where there are millions of Kinh and minority people living in the mountains and uplands of North Vietnam. Central to this is the division of the country from 1954 to 1975, which prevented the south being used as an outlet for population pressure in the Red River delta. Many of the Kinh farmers in the uplands and mountains moved in to these areas as part of population processes strongly managed and supported by the state, using the institutions of that time. These were the locally modified variant of neo-Stalinist central planning, reliant upon institutions that articulated a central ‘model’ and imposed from above, which were then modified in various ways to suit local interests – those of farmers and their local officials. In practice, this usually meant more markets and a ‘softer’ system than was laid down in the textbooks: an adaptation in the direction of greater efficiency to satisfy local needs. It also meant that negative experiences with such imposed methods were gained, and these fed discussions and pressures for the shift to a market economy with “Doi Moi” (the pro-market policies introduced at the 1986 VIth Party Congress), which came in during the mid 1980s.

As a consequence of these population movements, the northern Uplands and Mountains have a population far larger than would have been the case if the southern border had remained open. Over the longer-term, therefore, it is likely that much of this population will migrate into areas of industrialisation and urbanisation. Whether

those who leave are the richer or the poorer members of these communities will have great bearing upon local policies aimed at poverty reduction and local development, and this is likely to become of increasing importance as urbanisation gathers pace through this decade.

The initial institutional development model

The basic structures of a state-driven rural development effort were created during this period. Farmers were grouped into producer cooperatives, which managed directly most farming, although the private plots (5% land) acted as one base for sales to free markets. Most cooperative output was to be delivered to the state trading network according to the plan, at low prices compared with those on the market. Farmers within cooperatives were thus still the basic source of marketed surplus, and processors and exporters were state owned enterprises (SOEs). After the reforms of the early 1970s, in response to severe problems in the rural sector, cooperatives were internally organised into three sectors, with so-called specialised teams (in Vietnamese: *doi*), usually based upon villages within the communes. These three sectors were: livestock (*chan nuoi*), cultivation (*trong trot*) and sidelines (*nganh nghe*). Inputs to these sectors from outside the cooperatives were arranged through state bodies, such as SOEs (e.g. fertiliser), the irrigation companies (at district level), plant protection, sources of new seeds and varieties from state research institutes, and veterinary services.

These organisations were 100% budgeted by the state, and were essentially managed through the detailed plan of the “central plan”. Inputs supplied through them were meant to be matched by supplies in the other direction of surplus (pigs, rice, tea, artisanal products) to the state via the plan. In upland areas, the specialised brigades

and teams could be extended to areas such as tea and other high value cash crops, though these were usually preserved for SOEs. In a mechanical way, land above a certain slope was defined as forest land and reserved for state forestry enterprises (SFEs). In another mechanical way, cooperatives almost always were based in terms of their membership upon the administrative structures of the commune and village. In minority areas there was often a tension between these units, which were the objects of planning and service/materials supply, and others, based upon the often 'small' social groupings (often mobile).

In practice, the local political compromises involved in implementing such a system led to considerable spontaneous extension of market relations and non-implementation of the planning model, which showed itself across a range of areas, including local tensions within communes and cooperatives as resource control conflicts played themselves out. In such an environment, there was much scope for negotiation over input supplies and services thought to be of local value, and for side deals to be made that made actual supplies better suited to local interests.

Transition towards a agricultural market economy

The transition to a market economy through the 1980s and early 1990s was driven by partial reforms in 1981 which allowed SOEs to participate in markets [de Vylder and Fforde 1996]. At the same time a return to more family-based farming occurred, partially, in two stages, in 1981 and 1988, with reforms from the Party (not the state) essentially envisaging a reform of cooperatives rather than a decentralisation. Most cooperatives in the north were not actually and formally disbanded, though many vanished, especially in areas where they had not been strong, such as the minority areas. As one consequence, in many communes pre-existing 'old

style cooperatives', still not re-established according to the Cooperative Law, are now subject to renewed energising and reform [Fforde and Huan 2001].

The rapid economic growth of the 1990s was then naturally based upon three legs:

- SOEs, dominant in processing and export;
- Family farms, within structures such as the communes and cooperatives;
- And various emergent private and semi-private forms, especially in trade.

Unlike China, there is no equivalent in Vietnam to the Township and Village Enterprises.

What emerged in the late 1990s was an increasingly powerful and “normal” private sector, supported by far light regulatory costs once the Law on Enterprises came in, but operating in an environment dominated by commercialised state structures.

It is important to emphasise the basic continuity between the 1980s and the 1990s, and its relative success. Commercialised SOEs were seen as the main outlet for marketed surplus, and as part of local development plans, supported by the inputs supply and extension activities ²

To generalise is to risk being wrong, and this characterisation needs qualification.

First, the very nature of conditions in the north prior to “Doi Moi” and the trajectory of the 1980s and 1990s, supported adaptive notions of change, which freed up the ‘forces of production’ at the base by watching and supporting local progressive change, which would naturally have been experimental, if not a ‘positive violation’ of

official norms. What is interesting is to see what the limits of this style of change, now well understood, are: to fully capture returns from public goods production, a far more top-down approach is needed.

Second, whilst the private sector off-farm only started to emerge in the late 1990s, it is not certain that this was caused by anti-private sector policy on the part of political conservatives and state business interests keen to preserve established market positions. More likely is that, in a very poor area, it took time for capital to be accumulated, prepared to move into such areas. Certainly, survey evidence (eg the range of surveys carried out under the direction of Per Ronnas at the Stockholm School of Economics) suggests that it was market conditions, rather than trouble accessing formal credits, or regulatory problems, that largely determined this process, combined with the pace at which capital (both financial, physical, human and social) could be accumulated.

Third, whilst poverty levels declined rather fast [World Bank et al 2003], and many family farms built up equity (supported by their diverse technology and lack of extreme specialisation), stable outlets to export and local markets, largely mediated by SOEs, did not develop as hoped.

Finally, local planning processes, especially institutional planning, were very mixed.

For example, a number of provinces moved early to accept the positive developmental value of such ideas as participation, demand-driven services supply, and institutional change that involved civil society elements such as farmers' groups within villages, the private sector in off-farm sectors (a basic lesson from the 1980s and 1990s, to do with 'living with spontaneous change').³

But the formal general systems articulated by central government moved more slowly in these directions. For example, the ‘new-style’ cooperatives were often imposed, or at least did not come up from farmers’ own initiatives (the cooperative leaders can add time in post when calculating their state pensions).

The basic model of SOEs procuring and on-marketing farmers’ surpluses, supported by a local development plan expressed through extension and other state support (credits, irrigation, forest planning ...), which had a close organic relation to the pre-“Doi Moi” thinking, has obvious tensions with the ‘bottom-up’ thinking that could assess the varying contributions of alternative institutional arrangements (both formal and informal) to local development goals (growth, poverty reduction, cash crop development, social stability, cultural development ...).

The current situation and trends

Nowadays, we are living under different conditions, headed by the slogan “Doi Moi”. The market economy challenges actors in the rural scene to define “new rules for the institutional game” to continue in a pragmatic way the growth scenario.

It is useful to distinguish between the growth model of the 1990s, and what is new today. In considering the value of alternative institutional setups for supplying services to farmers, there are a number of important issues, which distinguish the “Doi Moi” period of the 1980s and 1990s from the emerging situation.

Private enterprises and State-led development

First, there is the emergent private non-farm sector. Unlike SOEs, the private sector is not familiar or close (in terms of social relations) to local planners and unlikely to be integrated into important social structures such as the mass

organisations, the Party and other SOEs. For example, SOEs' procurement spending is typically financed by state bank credits, arranged as part of the local development plan.

How should the private sector be treated in this respect? What relationship can be made or developed between the private sector state bank credits to farmers to finance planting of cash crops?

What should be done, if anything, to mediate between farmers and private processors when contracts are not respected (a common occurrence, especially for SOEs)? The shift to a 'law governed state' logically means that private sector activities are to be regulated, not directly as SOEs could be, but through law, so if they do not break the law, but yet conflict with local development goals, what can be done?

Growth & poverty reduction

Second, are the results of success. As has been pointed out [Beckman 2001] one useful way of thinking about the effects of the rather steep reductions in poverty in the 1990s is in terms of the shift from 'poor communities' to 'poor people within communities'. Thus, tensions between poverty reduction and growth are more difficult to mediate, for example in the targeting of extension activities to the poor whose marketed surpluses are naturally far lower than their successful neighbours. Extension is already commercially sensitive as part of locally negotiated cost-recovery and "service for payment" activities,. In the early 1990s, most people were poor; now, they are not. Here we can more easily understand the trend for donors to move into geographical areas where they can find poor communities (the mountains

rather than the uplands), since the implementation mechanisms are easier to work with, and poverty reduction targets easier to meet.

Democratisation and decentralisation

Third, are the complex tensions to do with democratisation and decentralisation. Increasingly, development resources are decentralisable to commune level or below. Previously, with a heavy top-down formal planning system, this was not the case. Under these circumstances, a wide range of issues arises to challenge local regulation of such processes, and to mediate and regulate situations where official rural service supply systems, operating according to plan, are not well integrated into a diverse local (and presently resourced) set of target groups. A central element of these processes is usually expressed in terms of the assumed low capacity of local (commune and village) officials, but often the tensions may be more to do with the fundamental shift away from the adapted input and plan-driven framework that was so successful in the 1990s and which was, in fact, so close to the old central-planning set-up *as actually operated in north Vietnam*.

So, if we ask the question, what has changed compared to pre-“Doi Moi” (and what will change on the mid-term) in the rural service institutions themselves (concerning their task systems, human & social systems, control systems), we can usefully think about the following.

Adaptation of administratively determined service systems

What has so far changed is rather less than much has been commonly thought. Basic plans are still expressed in terms of a development model where family farms are supported in the increased supply of marketed surpluses to SOEs, with local

institutions at times subject to direct intervention (the 'new-style' cooperatives). With a basically fixed institutional frame, sector plans are still predominantly expressed in terms of inputs required to meet given output targets (see for example the MARD Plan, 2001). What is fundamentally different is that today access to far better outlets for surpluses, new technologies, and the removal of producer cooperatives has resulted into a widespread accumulation at the level of the family farm. Only in the late 1990s, did rural service institutions start to have to cope with situations where the rural economy was one with major non-trader actors who were not SOEs. Importantly, the economic growth added greatly to both the tax base and farmers' incomes, so the rural service institutions were no longer starved of resources. The basic model of a administratively determined 'service delivery' attitude, part of a local development plan that included SOEs, yet adapted in various ways to negotiated delivery, continued.

Increased local resource mobilisation

Second, in the medium term, much will change. The rise of the private sector and the increasing pace of globalisation are associated with a range of changes that pose quite new problems to service delivery within the context of local development efforts. For example, consider farmers' organisations other than the new-style cooperatives. These, research shows and theory argues, are far more effective mobilisers of local resources and supports to farmers than officially-sponsored bodies. Attwood and Baviskar, in an excellent survey of Indian experience (1995) start their text with the statement that "Many rural development projects have failed because they were imposed from above" (op.cit. p. 3).⁴ Yet they receive almost no support from government, which continues to focus upon the more cumbersome new-style

cooperatives.

Arguments of efficiency and international competitiveness suggest that mobilisation of these institutional forms should become the targets of local development efforts, both as recipients of resources and as gauges of good local government performance. As the local planning system changes, so great stresses can be expected, not least as these have considerable importance for social stability. In some provinces, one can probably see shifts in these directions more clearly than in others.

Increased institutional complexity

If we come now to examine the local service supply systems, in terms of task systems, human and social systems, control systems and basic rationale, we can see that the main tasks remain formidable. What has changed in their institutional context is primarily the rise of the private sector and the growth of farmers' organisations. For the logic implied by SOEs, new-style cooperatives and the underlying logic of development planning did not imply major changes, in fact, from the old system.

If we look at state monopolies, patronage systems, pressure for change by farmers, and modes of farmer's resistance and or withdrawing from market forces (Dao Minh Truong, Thomas Sikor 2000), then this is clear. In the north, unlike the south, competition between SOEs, since the emergence of the market economy, and indeed before, has made it hard to maintain monopolies simply on the basis of entry blocks. Rather, creation of economic rents has required use of market power across a range of structures, supported by patronage systems, and in the face of pressures from active farmers who have shown that they are not likely to respect contracts or local zoning unless it appears in their interests to do so. Poor farmers have long

had recourse to ‘the forest’, with illegal logging, collection of firewood and so on involving withdrawal from patterns of market interaction seen as unprofitable. Thus the remaining elements of top-down planning remain as weak, in terms of predictable implementation, as they ever were. Changed resource availability and repeated learning, related to more sophisticated social networks, have made it more profitable for farmers to use SOEs and others to market.

Responses and adaptations to the current situation

It has long been assumed that farmers in the Uplands and Mountain areas were ‘self sufficient’ (*tu cung tu cap*) and this meant that they were insensitive to market incentives. However, in many areas even before markets started to grow rapidly in scope, food deficit producers could early be seen using trade to improve their nutritional status⁵. However, it is the case that a central issue is how the present (government, NGO, private) organisations are or are not equipped to support the transformation of the agricultural sector from a previously predominantly self-sufficient sector into a commodity one, with a base in family farming.

Successful achievements

At one level, drawing upon the basic stance of the central-planning model, and in the light of the success of the 1990s, we can say that they are equipped to do so. Unlike other regions that have ‘de-collectivised’, the service organisations (seed supply, plant protection, state marketing structure, inputs delivery) that were responsible for delivering inputs so as to implement the plan remained in existence, and were modified and developed to match the large growth in client numbers due to the shift from cooperatives to families as the ‘base unit’. This was and is a system of

service institutions providing incentives to producers, access to means of production, access to domestic and export markets, human development and so on. The success of the IPM network is one good example [Sorby et al 2003], and more fundamentally so is the rather rapid growth of agricultural output through the 1990s.

More efficiency is required

The main issue, though, is clearly that of efficiency, combined with that of accommodating the major changes implied by the tensions arising from the retention of the basic 'input-output' planning philosophy. Looked at in terms of local planning, and bearing in mind the ongoing efforts at development of local authority capacity and intent through decentralisation and Public Administration Reform, focuses attention on the way in which provinces conceive of what they are doing, and the ways in which this planning philosophy supports and hinders greater efficiency and competitiveness. There is not likely to be a simple trade-off, yet this issue is made more complicated by two of its implications.

Efficiency requirement 1: Contradictions to be overcome

First, is the question of what there is for local service bodies in sustaining poverty reduction efforts via economic growth. It is natural for service bodies, which are tasked to reduce poverty to give lower priority to supporting farmers with higher cash crop surpluses and accumulation prospects, and so risk not hitting important local plan targets. The extent to which this risk is real, and the extent to which there is a trade-off between local state resource allocation decisions that support growth and those that attack poverty, is something that will need to be learnt, and the current plan system modified to explore these issues. More concretely, for example, extension

workers focussed upon implementing local output targets for new cash crops, linked to local procurement plans and supported by credit allocations and other resourcing decisions will face difficult choices if they are also, simultaneously, required to meet poverty reduction targets if the communities within which they work are increasingly heterogeneous.

Efficiency requirement 2: Resource allocations

Second, is the question of efficiency inherent in the increasingly important sectoral choices emerging as the private sector and farmers' groups act both to complement and compete with established SOEs and other businesses. It is never easy to evaluate contributions to potential growth and it is upon this that choices about allocation of resources between these sectors must be made. These must draw upon both research and experience, and this will not be easy in areas where existing policy has operated more whole-heartedly within the existing official philosophy, and so the rural service system is more focussed upon input delivery to meet output targets than upon wider development goals.

Efficiency requirement 3: Roles of local Government

From this we can answer the question of what was and is the role of the (weak or developmental?) government in removing and erecting barriers to promote institutional development for agricultural growth (infrastructure, education, health services). Upon what does the authority and effectiveness of local government ultimately depend? With local development goals that command wide local popular support, and bearing in mind likely tensions between the needs of better-off farmers and various types of poor people, local government should be both erecting barriers to

protect local infant industries from monopoly power as well as seeking ways of developing local markets, such as through its infrastructure planning. In all this, there are important issues to do with local politics and interests, and, it must be said, in the legacy of central planning often considerable local popular resentment.

Additional opportunities for progressive change

Whilst this suggests perhaps a heavy burden, what we are likely to see is a pragmatic working-through of the pros and cons of various alternatives. Part of this will be a greater focus and discipline in the local state, as well as gradual reformulation of local planning thinking.

To attain greater efficiency, there is clearly a need to enhance individual and corporate rural entrepreneurship and employment creation. This must come from an understanding of what this can do for the attainment of local planning goals, and this in turn must come from a process that shows that the private sector 'adds value'. This is not easy to do.

In a similar vein, the newly established extension services and information provision systems will increasingly need to be judged in terms of what they in their turn do to support local development. Here the variation in practice between provinces provides points of comparison, as does the near-saturation of various areas by development projects and programs. An example of the latter is the acceptance in some areas of participatory methods, after considerable discussion and experimentation.⁶

Within this perspective, the movement, strongly supported by government, to establish new-style cooperatives can be seen to reduce the clarity of the learning process. For such pressures make it far harder to see whether they do or do not

contribute to local value-added, through farmers' willingness to resource them (as they do with the farmers' groups). One role for these types of organisations is, of course, to act as holders of local public goods producers, such as the irrigation and power systems, but this requires a conceptualisation of their roles that assumes that local planning is more developed than perhaps it actually is, so far. Perhaps, though, these bodies exist for primarily political reasons; it is hard to say.

The lesson from the 1980s was that the natural evolution of economic organisation tended to throw up solutions that were efficient, in a narrow and short-term sense. With the demands of the present so much greater, in terms of efficiency and competitiveness, it is natural that local planning move to a more active role in exploring institutional arrangements, to support new types of organisations, moulded according the "lessons learnt". This can be seen in the gathering position of the private sector and the farmers' groups, although clearly there are policy tensions here. We know that "learning by doing" has been an important feature of reform efforts, also in the cooperative period/pre-"Doi Moi", yet the demands of the moment mean that this task is far more demanding than it was in the past.

Conclusions

Let me finish by looking quickly at key questions.

- What is institutional success in the Vietnamese context?

I have argued that this remains largely as it was in the days of central planning, focussed upon input delivery in the context of a plan of output and surplus delivery. This is now changing, and these changes require fundamental shifts in how local development targets cope with trade-offs, such as those between poverty

reduction (implying working with the poor) and economic growth (implying working with farmers better placed to mobilise resources into new cash crops et al).

- Why are rural service delivery organisations successful? What are important explaining factors?

Paradoxically, rural service delivery organisations have tended to be successful if *either* they were well enough resourced (or lucky enough) to be in a situation where farmers incentives led to them to want to meet planners' targets (given that planners did not control outcomes as they did not control all resources needed for production), *or* if they could negotiate local deals, involving resource allocation decisions that allowed farmers' incentives to be matched to those of planners, for example permitting subsidised inputs to be moved into other lines.

- How to make them more successful in the struggle for poverty alleviation?

Here the answer has to be to do with coping with the reform of local planning and development thinking, as already discussed.

- And related with the last question, what is needed as human resource development effort in that respect within the respective organisations?

Logically, this issue must follow on from the wider changes I have discussed. So long as the wider plan frame remains input based, then there is no need for service providers to shift away from traditional top-down methods, and, although there is obvious scope for improving these, it is worth recalling that they have accompanied rather rapid agricultural growth so far, even if they are not in keeping with world 'best practice' in terms of farmer-driven extension methods!

Melbourne January 2004

Sources:

Baviskar, B.S and Donald W. Attwood, Finding the middle path – the political economy of cooperation in rural India, Boulder CO: Westview, 1995.

Beckman, Malin, Extension, poverty and vulnerability in Vietnam, Country Study for the Newchatel Initiative, ODI/SLU Working Paper # 152, Oct 2001

(http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working_papers/wp152.pdf)

Dao, Minh Truong and Thomas Sikor, Sticky Rice, collective fields, community development amongst the black H'mong, Agricultural Publishing House, Hanoi, 2000.

De Vylder, Stefan and Adam Fforde, From Plan to Market: the economic transition in Vietnam, Boulder: Westview, 1996.

Deinenger, Klaus, 1995, 'Collective agricultural production: a solution for transitional economies?', *World Development* Vol 23 No 8, pp 1317-1334.

Deng, Yingtao, China's Rural Economy: Urbanisation and Industrialisation, Rural Development: An Exchange of Chinese and Vietnamese Experiences, Hanoi 28/2/95 - 2/03/95

Fforde, Adam and Nguyen Dinh Huan, Vietnamese Rural Society and its Institutions: Results of a Study of Cooperative Groups and Cooperatives in three

Provinces, Canberra: Aduki p/l, 2001, www.aduki.com.au .

Fforde, Adam, *The Agrarian Question in North Vietnam 1974-79: a study of cooperator resistance to State policy*, Fforde, Adam, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1989.

Fforde, Adam, 'From Plan to Market: The economic transitions in Vietnam and China compared', in ed Anita Chan et al, *Transforming Asian Socialism: China and Vietnam Compared* Canberra: Allen and Unwin 1999.

Haug, R., Some leading issues in international agricultural extension, a literature review, *The journal of agricultural education and extension*, Volume 5 No. 4 1999.

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, *Agriculture and Rural Development 5-year plan (2001-2005)*, http://www.vdic.org.vn/eng/pdf/agri_rural_dev.pdf

Nguyen van Bo and Le Hung Ngoc, *Extension: Outline of establishing the programme extension on fertilizer for crops in Vietnam* (www.fadinap.org/vietnam/extension.html)

Poussard, H, *Building an Extension Network in Vietnam*, *The journal of agricultural education and extension*, Volume 6 number 2 December 1999

Sorby, Kristina et al, *Integrated Pest Management in Development*, Washington DC: World Bank, 2003.

World Bank et al, 'Vietnam Development Report 2003 – Poverty' – available at <http://www.worldbank.org.vn>, 2003.

Zhang, Gang and Sjoberg, Orjan, *What Role for Local Government? The*

Chinese Experience, Rural Development: an Exchange of Chinese and Vietnamese Experiences, Hanoi 28/02/95 - 02/03/95

¹ This is a revised version of a talk given to the Refresher Course 2003, organised by Thai Nguyen University of Agriculture and Forestry (Vietnam) and Larenstein, University for Professional Education (The Netherlands) in Thai Nguyen City, October 2003. Many thanks to the participants and organisers, and especially to Jan van Huis for comments and suggestions for revisions to earlier drafts.

² 1993 saw establishment of an extension service [Poussard 1999], but with rural development still solidly within this model, it mainly served to push for plan implementation.

³ See the reviews of the Swedish supported upland development projects of the 1990s, available at www.sida.se

⁴ For a revealing comparison of the advantages of service cooperatives over the producer cooperatives of classic socialism, see Deinenger 1995.

⁵ The use of manioc to rear pigs for sale for rice purchases was one example

⁶ See, for example, the evaluations of the Swedish projects in the northern Uplands and Mountains, www.side.se